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Introduction
This paper has two thc!mes, both of which have preoccupied economists for many years. The first is the volatility of stock prices. It has long hct:n suggc!sted thal the erratic movt!ments of stllCk prices art! incompatible with rational investor behaviÇlur. More recentJy. formal empirical tests have been devised which suggest that stock prices are excessively volatik. These tests show apparentJy systematic violations of a variance bounds inequality.
The second theme is the question of how a rarional person should behave under uncertainty.
particularly when he or she has littJe information about the form of the uncertainty. Knight (1921) was a notable proponent of the view that this type of uncertainty is qualitativdy different from risl..-y situations where the parameters of the risk are well-kno\\n to the decision maker. However, the currentJy standard model in e conomics, due to Savage (\954), predicts that agents should have subjective probability distributions which do not make this distinction.
In this pape r , we show that mode1s which formalize Knightian un.:ertainty can hc used to explain high stock price volatility. We provide an example in which the variance bound is violated.
Since the future profitability of companies depends heavily on many long-term tàctors. including political fa.:tors, which are extremely difticult to predict. it is natural to think that the stock market is characterized by a high degree of Knightian uncertainty. Therefore. we suggest this type of behaviour under uncertainty as a possible explanation of the high volatility of stock market prices.
Excess Volatility
The variance bounds restricti0ns were deveJ0pcd hy LcRoy and Porte r ( 1981) and Shiller ( 198 I). Here we give only the briefest outiine or the réstri.:tions anJ the é\ij:::n.:e: the readér is reic:rreJ !t) l..çRt.)~ .!-\1989) survey and Shiller's (1989) book fJr further d=rails and rderen.::.'s. The ~:.artir.g r-. Jim b L' 1-:
principIe that jf afents are risk-neutral an asset" s price ShllUld equal the expc.:tation ()f the diSCl\untéu \'alue oi tl-}e future di\·ij.~nds. Here Wé ~ill as~ume for simrlicity a .. ir.l20Cln where the a~s:.'t ray~ J ~ingle iiquiliaring diviJend with r,~s;!m value V. ánd the ,'urrem rrke j-P P Jerénd~ (m Ül~ agen: . . .
P = E(VI I)
The variance hounJs inequality is derived from lhe conJition Var(V) = VarlE(V; 1)) + EIVar(V; 1)) which is in rurn an immediate cOr\S(!quence of lhe relation E(V) = E(E(V: I)). Since variances art: nonnega tive and the price equals the expt!cted value.
Var(V) ~ Var(P).
(1)
To test this requires some statistical assumptions. How do the variance oounds apply to a siruation of Knightian uncertaimy? Then the agem does nOI know the actual probability distribution 01' lhe value. A risk neutral agem who satisties the Savage axioms has a subjective probability distribution. This subjective distribution "ilI in general differ from the actual distributivn, and S0 the variance hound can be violated in a probabilistic sense (~cause the expectation. under the actual distribution. l't" the .:'onditional expcctation under the suhjective àistribution. ",iH in general differ from t.'1e actual unconditional expectation l. Howevc:!r. it seems implausible to expIain the Iarge amoum of evidence that has bc:!en colIected by saying that agents svstematicallv have subjective distributions \\ith hillher variance lhan actual distributions (althouch . .
. . .
-' -loglcally. this argument is Juhil1US bc:!cause ir implies lha! th\! agem àfectiveÍ\ knows the true probability distriburion M" Ü1e stat\!S bu! with a k,s rr~:isé information Sétl. \\'~ ti"lc>r:::t"l1r\! turn tn another éxpléinati0n: mat th.: ag::nts' Jé,isi,1~. in simati~)ns ut Knight:an un.:.::-taln~. :ir.: n·)1 t'ncertainty A 'ersion 3 to the forme r as ris/,; and the latter as uncenainry, or Knightian uncertainty. Synonyms lhat are used in the literaturt! in(lude:! wukttt! lottay. for risk, anJ horsi! lonery and amhiguity. fnr uncertainty. WC! now givC! a very brid t!XpOSitillO of lhe:! main aspc!cts of lhe! modd. The readc!r is retúred to tht! papc!rs by Schmeidler and Gilhoa cited above for.a compktt! dt!scription and for the underlying axioms, and to Dow and Werlang (1991) which contains an t!xample and an application to portfolio choicC!.
Simonsen and Werlang (1991) also describe the implications for portfolio choice. Bewley (1986) presents a similar modd which is also designed to capture Knightian uncertainty. His model predict. 'i Ihat uncertainty leads to inertia, a te!ndency to favour the! staTUS quo. while in SchmeidJer-Giltxla there is a tendency to choose acts where the age:!nt does not end up bearing uncertainty.
The Schmeidler-Gilboa model predicts that agents' behavior \\ill be represented by a utility function and a (subjective) non-additive probability distribution. A non-additive probability p retlecting aversion to un.:ertainty satisfies the condition
rather than the stronger condition satisfied hy (additive) probabilities:
In particular. p(A) ~ p(N) may be less than I: the difference can tio.! thought of as a mc:!asure of the uncertainty attached by the agent to the event A.
The agent maximizes expected utility under a non-additive distribution. where the t!xpc!ctation af a nan-negative random variable X is defined as:
Assodatcd v.ith a n.:m-additive probat-iliry p is a set ~ of additiVc:: prl 1 bahilitie:!s called the (Clre I'!" í'.
which is ddined tarudogousiy t,) the core! in cUllpcrative game Ihe:!of) I as the Sét (H additivc! rrooahil;~ measures 7( su..:h ttat 1í~A) ~ p(Ai for ali évents A. If the nlm-adJitive pr(lhahiiity S4ti~ties in::.'quaii::, (~) (re!le..:ting aversi,-,n to un..:ertaintyl the ":0ré is non-;:mpty. (A c!osely rela~d modd oi hc!ha\'H)r do nut necessarily know the true probability distribution. However, for the analysis ~Iow we will need some relationship ~~oeen the subjective non-additive distributions which rerre~ent agenL<;' hc!havi(lur. and the frequencies observed by the econometrician. We \\i1l thereiore assume thal the eCllnpme::trician observes realizations drawn from one element of the core.
When agents' prefere::nces satisfy Savage's axioms, it is natural to assume:: thal lhey upJate according to Bayes' role. Although this is not a consequence of Savage's mt)(Jel. many consideratlUns paint to Bayes' rule (the standard argument is given in Kreps (19881: Brown cl976) goes furlher.
showing that il is optimal for agents to use Bayes' rule). Wilh non-adJitivl! probabilities. the Situati(lfl is nOI so ckar bUI the Dempster-Shafer rule is lhe natural generalizatian oi Bayes' Rule j Dempster. For lhe lhree prohahility Jistrihutions iisleQ anove. \\e haw:
In the case of (7). r! = l,~ .. :\bsence of Arbitra2e Opp()rtunil~ Equall~. the agent must nOI have an in-:enrive to sei! the assei and huy il had lmé rerilxl later:
;:~\"ISI -P -?(Sl] :S EfV(sl].
; : -P. -i 6 = p" -1 :: :lOd in SUle :. 0 -p -1 6 = p, -: 6. :-fén.:e U1e cf"'ltrage has
?, -1 61 -~ 1 6.1;2) -,j 3.1 ''+) = P. = Ef\'islj. 
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